Formal Opinions
Page 26 of 42
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This is in response to your letter of July 22, 1991, in which you seek our opinion on whether the Department of Transportation ("DOT") has the authority to cancel the unexpended balance of purchase orders that the DOT has issued to Hartford Paving Inc. ("Hartford Paving") for bridge painting services under Contract Award No. 89--A-13-1054-C. You further ask whether the DOT can avoid contracting with Hartford Paving on future painting projects and instead use other companies listed in the contract award.
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By letter dated February 20, 1990, your predecessor in office, Commissioner Papandrea, requested our opinion on whether the Department of Housing (DOH) is a public housing agency within the purview of the United States Housing Act of 1937.1 The request was prompted by letters from William H. Hernandez, Jr., Manager of the Hartford Office of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD").
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By memo dated January 27, 1992 you requested an opinion from this office on whether state law can be construed to allow the Governor the option to not implement ("trigger off") an otherwise operable extended unemployment compensation benefit program (EB) should unemployment continue to rise to a certain level in this state. The purpose of this option is to allow the state's unemployed to be subject solely to a federally-funded emergency unemployment compensation (EUC) program. You also ask, assuming such a construction is allowable, whether the Governor may delegate the authority to "trigger off" state EB, as well as the authority to make all necessary contractual arrangements with the U.S. Department of Labor for administration of the EUC program, to the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. Section 31-250.
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We are writing in response to your letter of February 19, 1991 in which you request our advice concerning whether certain physicians and psychologists, who serve as "medical consultants" and "psychological/psychiatric consultants'' to the Division of Rehabilitation Services and who are hired pursuant to personal services agreements, are immune from personal liability pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 4-165.
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This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning the terms of office of Commissioners of the Department of Liquor Control. Specifically, you seek an opinion on the applicability of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-2, which states that Commissioners are to be appointed to staggered, six-year terms.
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In a memorandum dated October 5, 1998, your agency asked for our opinion regarding two questions that have arisen since the issuance of our September 28, 1998 opinion regarding Public Act 98-111. The first question asks the following: 1) A review of the opinion would seem to indicate that an individual convicted of, for example, C.G.S. Sec. 53a-71(a)(1), and sentenced to a term of probation commencing September 28, 1998 would not have to be registered under either Public Act 97-183 or Public Act. 98-111. Your second question is as follows: 2) Section 3(b) of the Act provides that any individual who has been subject to the registration requirements of Public Act 97-183 must register under Public Act 98-111 in the manner required for sexually violent offenders.
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You have requested our opinion on whether Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-374b(b) and 7-403a authorize municipalities to issue general obligation bonds to fund their unfunded actuarial accrued pension liabilities. We understand that this request for opinion is prompted by the proposed issuance of general obligation bonds by the Town of Stratford for the foregoing purpose, and that the Town's bond counsel, Squire Sanders & Dempsey, has opined that the issuance is authorized under state law.
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You have requested our advice on the applicability of 1990 Public Acts No. 90-304, now codified in Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-570d, to the Department of Correction. You specifically ask whether an official of the Department of Correction is a criminal law enforcement official for purposes of the exception contained in subsection (b)(1) of Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-570d.
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This is in response to your predecessor's letter of August 7, 1990, requesting an opinion regarding the proper assessment of attorney's fees to personal injury recoveries which include basic reparations benefits (BRB), under Conn. Gen. Stat/ § 38 -325(b).
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You have asked for general advice regarding correspondence the Department of Consumer Protection (the "Department") received from the Mohegan Tribe and Mashantucket Pequot Tribe concerning the proposed sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages at particular sites on the Tribes' federal reservations.
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This is a formal opinion regarding whether abortion must be included in the coverage provided under the Husky Plan, Part B ("Husky B"), a program designed to ensure health care coverage to all children in Connecticut.
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You have asked whether the Southeastern Connecticut Regional Resource Recovery Authority (SCRRRA) is subject to your auditing authority as set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat.
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Upon a recommendation of the federal government, your agency requested a formal opinion from the Attorney General concerning two grantees which currently receive Community Service Block Grant (CSBG) funding. The opinion concerns whether the grantees are "eligible entities" as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9902(1).
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By letter dated July 19, 1991, you state that a company called Hartford Paving Inc. ("Hartford Paving" ) has been performing bridge painting work for the Department of Transportation ("DOT") pursuant to purchase orders issued to it by the DOT in accordance with Contract Award No. 890-A-13-1054-C. You have asked our opinion as to whether the Department of Consumer Protection has a right to attach or garnish funds.
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You have asked for my opinion with regard to a question raised by the state auditors on the propriety of an expenditure made by the Criminal Justice Commission. It is my understanding that your request was prompted by a recommendation made by the auditors, who concluded that it appeared that the Division's June 1996 reimbursement of legal fees to a State's Attorney in connection with his reappointment to that position in 1988 may have circumvented the intentions of the General Assembly with respect to the total monies approved for payment to the State's Attorney by the Claims Commissioner.